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ABSTRACT: Conflicts between water users are increasing, making evident the lack of a judicious, balanced and 
transparent procedure for water allocation. This is particularly apparent in regions where demand comes from 
users with a wide range of needs and different levels of power, and where human appropriation of water is 
reaching unsustainable levels. Allocation mechanisms with varying degrees of governmental intervention exist in 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, and they reflect the priorities that these societies give to relevant normative 
principles governing water: equity, efficiency and sustainability. Water laws in these three countries indicate that 
1) while efficiency has become the bastion of neo-liberalisation, equity and sustainability principles are either 
neglected or become subsidiary, 2) implicit definitions of equity fall short in promoting the interests of the 
disadvantaged, and 3) the complex definition, measurement and monitoring of what constitutes a sustainable 
scale of human water use, make it an impractical goal. Achieving a balance between equity, efficiency and 
sustainability appears unrealistic, suggesting the need to remove efficiency as a principle in water allocation and 
make it an important but subsidiary tool to equity and sustainability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Water allocation refers to the rules and procedures through which access to water is decided for 
individual or collective use, and in relation to availability. Once water becomes seasonally scarce in 
response to higher demand and increasing variability of precipitation, water allocation rules and 
procedures become more important as mechanisms to prevent conflict. The complexity of the water 
allocation task and the increasing pressure on water (increasing demand and variability) have 
stimulated the revision of water allocation goals and means in many countries. Allocation mechanisms 
with varying degrees of governmental intervention exist in the Andean region including water rights, 
licences or concessions, and they reflect the priorities that these societies give to relevant normative 
principles governing water: equity, efficiency and sustainability. 
The distrust in the market as the 'best' mechanism to allocate water among competing users seems 
to indicate that economic efficiency is not the main goal of Andean societies. But then, what are the 
active mechanisms for water allocation? What do laws tell us about the values and guiding principles 
that these societies have chosen to allocate water? The underlying question is how countries are 
dealing with the trade-offs and potential complementarities between equity, efficiency and 
sustainability in water allocation. As stated by Adger et al. (2005) the relative weight allocated to each 
criterion is not given but rather emerges from societal processes of consent and action; the balance 
between them is dynamic as they are promoted or contested by societies. 
Government policies consistently state that resources will be allocated with equity but what 
constitutes equity is highly unclear (Syme et al., 1999). In many countries including the Andean ones, 
equity goals are often stated as a priority in water policies, even if undefined. In practice, markets and 
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efficiency considerations persist, skewing allocation in favour of those who have the ability and means 
to use water to produce the greatest economic returns, thus trading off equity against efficiency goals 
(Mehta, 2006). Equity can also be used "to cloak self-interest" (Syme et al., 1999: 52) or it can be 
promoted as an instrument for economic growth and development (World Bank, 2006). Thus the 
explicit or implicit definition of equity in water allocation significantly impacts outcomes in water access 
by users with diverse levels of power and water needs. Moreover, the compliance of national water 
policies with the international water governance agenda has implied the technification, universalisation 
and depoliticisation of water allocation (Boelens and Seeman, 2014; Joy et al., 2014; Perreault, 2014). 
Consequently, guiding principles of water allocation (equity, efficiency and sustainability) have been 
assumed to equally benefit all members of society when, in practice, these concepts are far from being 
neutral. 
The trade-offs between equity, efficiency and sustainability have been well documented in the 
literature, particularly the trade-offs between equity and efficiency. Some authors (Mehta, 2006; 
Wegerich, 2007; Ingram et al., 2008; Araral, 2010; Achterhuis et al., 2010; Zwarteveen and Boelens, 
2014) have described how efficiency tends to be a preferred goal for the allocation of water, 
particularly in situations where participation in decision making (procedural justice) is ignored. The goal 
of a limited scale of the economy relative to the physical limits of resources is consistently referred to 
as the goal of sustainability, and its relationships with equity and efficiency have been addressed to a 
lesser extent. 
Assuming the Western centric definition of human development as the capability of individuals to be 
and do what they want, inequality in human development has a causal relation with sustainability in 
both directions. More inequality will lead to more unsustainability and vice versa (Neumayer, 2011). 
The connection between the three goals has been addressed by ecological economists like Daly (1991, 
1992), Daly and Farley (2004), Lawn (2004, 2007) and Malghan (2010). They have recognised and 
described the relationship between these goals and the need for policies that are aware of such a 
relationship. Malghan (2010) states that when inequality is high, efficiency is high, leading to an 
increase in the size of the economy due to the rebound effect that drives up consumption with 
increasing efficiency. This interconnection between equity, efficiency and sustainability is manifested 
very clearly in the increasing extension of conflicts over insufficient or degraded water (sustainability), 
bringing to the forefront the notions of fairness, equity and justice to counterbalance the dominant 
socio-political notions of efficiency and markets that have been predominant in the early 21st century 
(Ingram et al., 2008). 
The goal of this paper is to show: 1) the balance between these principles in the water laws of three 
Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) to highlight the contentious situation across the 
region; 2) the relative imbalance between the multiple and diverse forms of efficiency found in water 
laws in contrast to the limited forms of equity and sustainability; and 3) the need to eradicate efficiency 
as a principle of allocation, to make it a subsidiary tool of sustainability and equity. The case of 
Colombia shows the concentration of decision-making power in environmental authorities, but with 
equity tools outside of the water legal framework; Ecuador has an ambitious focus on equity and 
redistribution goals, which are still at a theoretical level; and Peru has a marked orientation towards 
efficiency goals, particularly economic. 
DEFINITIONS 
The terms equity, efficiency and sustainability (or scale) are rarely defined in laws and regulations. In 
this section I summarise relevant literature about the scope of the terms in order to provide elements 
for the analysis of water laws in the Andes. 
Sustainability refers to the proportional relationship between the physical size of the economy and 
the ecosystem that contains and sustains it (Malghan, 2010). The goal of keeping the economic system 
Water Alternatives - 2014  Volume 7 | Issue 2 
Roa-García: Water allocation and trade-offs in the Andes Page | 300 
within sustainable limits requires that water is used and allocated in amounts such that the sources and 
sinks of water remain within their regenerative capacity in order to maintain ecosystems and their 
functions. In this context the goals of scale and sustainability are interchangeable. 
The notion of efficiency for water resources has had two main interpretations: technical and 
allocative. Technical efficiency has evolved to have a capped and an uncapped meaning. Initially 
efficiency was used as an accounting principle comparing what went into a machine or process with 
what came out, measuring what was conserved. For water distribution systems, efficiency is measured 
by comparing the water that is delivered to the final users with the water that is treated or lost in the 
distribution system. In this sense, efficiency has a ceiling and therefore it is used in the capped sense. 
In the last two centuries the term efficiency has migrated to biology, economics and business 
management to incorporate the meaning of potential for growth and creation (Alexander, 2008). Thus 
efficiency is called conservation when it refers to natural resources or energy use; it is called 
productivity in the context of economic growth or industry, or economies of scale when referring to 
production (Princen, 2005: 73). In water use, technical efficiency has recently been interpreted in the 
sense of increasing outputs for each drop of water, where there is no limit to conservation, 
productivity, or income generation (thus uncapped). Consequently, 'scaling-up' and thus continuous 
growth (unsustainablity) is intimately tied to our definition of efficiency (Malghan, 2012). 
Allocative efficiency is a term of neoclassical economics that has been applied to water as it 
becomes a scarce resource for competing users. Maximum allocative efficiency is reached when the 
scarce resource generates the most monetary value (as a measure of utility); this is achieved through 
the Pareto principle which defines optimal allocation as the one where no one can be made better off 
without making someone else worse off (Dinar et al., 1997). Pareto efficiency assumes that goods, 
products or resources have the same utility for everyone (monetary value), disregards unequal 
distribution of wealth and ignores the diminishing marginal utilities of wealth (Daly and Farley, 2004). 
Equity, equality and need are concepts at the core of struggles of societies for social justice (Jost and 
Kay, 2010). For the allocation of scarce resources, distributive and procedural justice offer useful 
perspectives. Distributive justice addresses issues of fairness especially equity considerations; and 
procedural justice addresses the decision-making rules used to determine distribution outcomes (Jost 
and Kay, 2010). In the realm of distributive justice, for priority resources such as water it has been 
found that societies prioritise justice considerations over any other criteria such as efficiency (Matania 
and Yaniv, 2007). 
General debates have made distinctions between equity, equality and need as guiding principles for 
allocation (Lerner, 1977). The concept of equity is associated with the proportionality (direct or inverse) 
between inputs and outcomes justifying the unequal allocation of resources based on merit (allocating 
more to those who contribute more) or historical injustice (allocating more to those who have been 
historically penalised with limited access); while equality is associated with outcomes being distributed 
equally among group members. One of the most basic forms of inequalities exists between those who 
have a say in decision making and those who do not (Neumayer, 2011), making procedural factors of 
justice at least as important as distributive factors (Tyler and Smith, 1998). Participation in the 
definition of decision-making processes as well as in the decision itself is a key component of 
procedural justice (Jost and Kay, 2010). 
Legitimacy as defined by Adger et al. (2005) or procedural justice as defined by Syme et al. (1999) 
are understood as the extent to which decisions are acceptable to participants and nonparticipants who 
are affected by those decisions, the hypothesis being that if procedural justice is demonstrated, the 
outcome is more likely to be accepted (Syme et al., 1999). There are no universal rules or procedures 
that guarantee the legitimacy of policies because cultural expectations and interpretations define what 
is or is not legitimate (Brown et al., 2002); but the perceived fairness of policies involving resource 
allocation is a powerful determinant of their legitimacy (Rasinsky, 1987; Zelditch, 2001). 
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As a vital irreplaceable resource, water is seen as a resource that should be allocated more equitably 
than efficiently, in contrast with other resources such as foods, transport, communication, for which 
people tend to be more willing to accept efficiency considerations and hence unequal (discriminatory) 
allocations (Rasinsky, 1987; Zelditch, 2001). But concepts such as efficiency, utility maximisation, 
individual choice and private property rights have become key terms used to legitimise interventions to 
modernise water management institutions (Achterhuis et al., 2010). In the context of Latin America the 
balance between equity and efficiency is of critical importance since recent water policies and reforms 
are perceived as prioritising efficiency over equitable allocation (Ahlers, 2005; Achterhuis, et al., 2010) 
and have increasingly led to conflicts as water use reaches the limits of available water resources. 
WATER ALLOCATION IN THE ANDEAN REGION 
The purpose of this section is to present the current rules for the allocation of water in Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru, and analyse them in relation to the balance between the three principles (equity, 
efficiency and sustainability). In Colombia, despite extensive legislation that seems to balance the three 
principles, the government maintains total control over water allocation rules and decisions; Ecuador is 
using progressive notions of equity and sustainability but lacks implementation capacity; and Peru has 
taken a strong stance for efficiency at the expense of the other two principles. One indicator of the 
balance between these principles is the use of the terms in the text of the constitution and water laws 
as shown in Table 1. The emphasis on efficiency versus equity and sustainability is remarkable 
particularly in Colombia and Peru. The Ecuadorian constitution presents a more balanced perspective, 
but I will show in this section that this balance has not been translated into enforceable rules. 
Table 1. Frequency of the use of the terms in constitutions and water laws. 
Constitution Colombia 1991 Ecuador 2008    Peru 1993 
Equity 12 33 0 
Equality 10 41 6 
Efficiency 12 21 2 
Sustainability 1 12 4 






Equity 1 1 0 
Equality 0 0 0 
Efficiency 22 5 106 
Sustainability 7 0 55 
Colombia 
Inspired by the 1972 Stockholm United Nations conference on the human environment, Colombia 
approved the code of natural resources in 1974 (Rodriguez-Becerra, 2009) whose aim is to preserve and 
restore the environment and renewable resources according to criteria of equity, permanent 
availability of resources and maximum social participation. Despite these creditable goals, the 
subsequent norms have not ascribed to them and have maintained the discretion of the state in 
decision making. At least eight laws or decrees directly regulate water, watersheds or water utilities 
resulting in a fragmented water legislation. 
The water code (decree 1541 of 1978) states its objective of compliance with the goals of the code 
of natural resources, implicitly recognising the linkages between inequality and the scale of use of 
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natural resources. The water code regulates the intervention of the state in the allocation of water 
through the combined mechanisms of concessions and water use fees. The state intervenes in the 
approval or rejection of water concessions (state regulation for prioritised allocation and for 
maintaining water use within the capacity of ecosystems) and once granted, water is subject to a use 
fee (state regulation for market efficiency and environmental protection). The water code incorporates 
aspects related to a non-explicit notion of distributive equity, economic efficiency and sustainability. In 
terms of equity the code established an order of priority for water allocation starting with human 
needs, followed by agriculture, hydroelectricity industry or manufacturing, mining and recreation (Art. 
41); it also established that domestic use will always have priority over other uses, collective uses over 
individual and the population of the region over the external (Art. 43). Even though the prioritisation of 
water allocation is done with an intention of ensuring that economic activities do not interfere with the 
satisfaction of human needs, the lack of practical mechanisms of enforcement and oversight (Uribe 
Botero, 2005) prevents the link between this prioritisation and the pursuit of equity. 
One fundamental problem with water allocation and use under Colombian law is that concessions 
are subject to loose standards for their approval or renewal. Concessions are the responsibility of CARs 
(Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales) which are regional environmental authorities responsible for 
granting water concessions, water licences and the approval of environment management plans, and 
for control and monitoring of the quality and quantity of wastewater disposal. These authorities have 
discretion for approving, renewing, changing or cancelling concessions based on conditions that are not 
clearly defined (MacDonnell and Grigg, 2007). When several users of different sectors request 
concessions over the same water, they are granted through a discretional decision of the government 
official. 
It is estimated that 70% of small users do not hold a water concession (Uribe-Botero, 2005). This 
may be due to the cumbersome nature of the application process and the limited benefit that small 
users (e.g. small water distribution systems) perceive from holding a water right. However, as conflicts 
appear or increase, communities believe that a concession would provide the legal backing for reliable 
access to water and several regional environmental authorities have started to receive more 
applications from small rural organisations (Riascos, 2012). But given the significant number of 
requisites for the application process, including stream flow measurements in wet and dry seasons, 
concessions are largely accessed by water users with enough resources to gather all the required 
documentation since the CARs have limited resources (human and technological) and limited 
enforcement capacity (Uribe-Botero, 2005). Additionally, the concession process is one of 
administrative allocation (largely reviewed on a first come, first served basis) (MacDonnell and Grigg, 
2007) which means that some applicants have to wait for up to eight years before they are granted a 
water right. 
There are other attributes of concessions that make them an unreliable tool for equitable water 
allocation. In some watersheds the sum of concessions granted is above the capacity of the source 
(Uribe-Botero, 2005; Riascos 2012). Art. 37 of the water code established that the state is not 
responsible for providing the amount of water that is granted through concessions due to natural 
fluctuations in availability; that there is no chronological priority in the concessions granted; and that 
shortfall caused by drought, pollution, natural disasters or any other causes are to be managed by 
administrative regulation either on a pro-rata or other undefined basis (MacDonnell and Grigg, 2007). 
Since concessions are linked to a payment, they are seen primarily as an administrative mechanism 
that collects resources for water source protection in line with the land use plan of the watershed (Law 
812 of 2004, art. 89) more than as an instrument to solve equity issues or for maximising the benefits of 
water use for society. The mechanisms created in the Code of Natural Resources to charge water users 
and water polluters were designed and approved quite early (1974) in relation to other countries in the 
region. The ministry of the environment only regulated tariffs (decree 155 of 2004) more than 10 years 
after they were approved in Law 99 of 1993. Currently, the tariff paid for water is less than 1 Colombian 
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peso per cubic meter of water (around US$0.00053/m3) used or granted (with uses different from 
domestic being slightly higher). These low rates make the instrument ineffective in encouraging 
efficient use (Rudas, 2009). Concession holders focus on requesting large concessions at little additional 
cost instead of focusing on reducing leakages or other sources of inefficiency (Rudas, 2010). 
The concept of efficiency is used repeatedly in the norms which stipulate that management of 
natural resources (decree 2811 of 1974) in general and water (decree 1541 of 1978) in particular will 
strive for an efficient use, compatible with their conservation and the collective interest (Art. 45 decree 
2811 of 1974). Even if efficiency is not defined, it is apparent that the emphasis is on technical efficiency 
as required by law 373 of 1997 that established that the amount of water dedicated to any individual 
activity should not exceed the necessary amount to achieve the purpose of that activity, and that large 
water users (urban purveyors, irrigation, drainage and hydroelectric projects) should design a 
programme of efficient use of water. This programme must be approved by the granting authority 
which has discretion to decide the level or type of efficiency that is acceptable (MacDonnell and Grigg, 
2007). 
Despite the intentions of the code of natural resources to provide maximum participation in the 
management of renewable resources, participation in the allocation of water is limited to the possibility 
to oppose the granting of a concession being considered for approval (Art. 60 of the water code). More 
recently, the Colombian government created the watershed management and planning process 
(POMCAs), defined by decree 1729 of 2002 with the purpose of establishing or restoring the balance 
between the economic use of renewable resources and the biophysical conservation of watersheds. 
The POMCAs are formulated and approved by environmental authorities, and they identify and locate 
the areas where it is necessary to preserve the ecosystem, change land use and/or construct 
infrastructure for the sustainable use of natural resources. Based on the results of the POMCA, the 
environmental authorities can modify granted permits (water use and pollution) as well as submit 
environmental restrictions for land use to municipal authorities, since POMCAs have primacy over other 
decisions related to renewable resources. In practice, POMCAs are a limited instrument of participation 
precisely because all the decision-making responsibility was granted to CARs. As a consequence the 
participation of affected water users can be restricted to the initial phases (diagnosis, prospective, 
formulation) before decisions are made, and key players such as municipal governments and large 
corporations do not feel the need to participate since they can influence the decisions in the latter 
stages of the process (Bastidas, 2009). 
Addressing sustainability concerns, Colombia included water reserves (Art. 118 and 119) and the 
declaration of water source closure (Art. 121) in the water code of 1978. Reserves can be created for 
the development of a public utility, future development by the government, programmes of 
restoration, conservation or preservation of the quality or quantity of water or its associated 
environment, to develop aquaculture programmes or protect fish or flora habitats. Streams can be 
declared closed when the total of concessions granted reach or exceed the available water flow. 
Decisions on stream closure are based on the water scarcity index and ecological flows, tools that have 
been defined by the National Institute of Meteorology, Hydrology and Natural Resources (IDEAM) and 
that should be applied by CARs. Under reserves or closed basins no water concessions or authorisations 
may be issued. Although the intention of these articles is to limit the use of water below unsustainable 
rates, they have a limited applicability due to the lack of coordination with municipal planning 
authorities that independently of environmental authorities have the power to authorise development 
projects or do not have the capacity to prevent irregular urban growth. Once new developments are 
built, water organisations are obliged to provide water services, pushing water use above sustainable 
rates. 
The excessive state power to allocate water was challenged in 2009 through a referendum 
promoted by some 60 civil society organisations. The referendum proposed among other things, that 
the state should support the more than 12,000 community organisations providing water services in 
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rural and peri-urban areas. The law of public utilities (Law 142 of 1994) established that under the 
principle of equity poor households would receive a water tariff subsidy administered by the water 
provider; but the same law made the concession a requisite for community organisations to be eligible 
for state subsidies and therefore currently less than 15% of community water providers in the country 
receive subsidies (Roa-García and Pulido-Rozo, in press). Despite the significant support of people 
across the country, the referendum did not have the required endorsement by Congress and failed to 
materialise a shift towards a more equitable access to water (Harris and Roa-García, 2013). What this 
referendum did however was to initiate a re-politicisation of water allocation principles and catalysed 
dozens of local initiatives of environmental protection and the defence of common goods (Roa-
Avendaño and Rodríguez, 2011). 
More than the specific referendum for water, the writ of protection of constitutional rights (tutela) 
incorporated in the 1991 constitution has resulted in unprecedented decisions by the constitutional 
court to protect people and communitiesʼ access to water in defence of the equity and precautionary 
principle, directly connected to sustainability (Roa-García et al., in press). It is recognised that the 
constitutional courtʼs decisions on a case-by-case basis do not represent a change in the legal 
framework for water, but the defence of the human right to water, even if not explicitly incorporated in 
the constitution, and the respect for minority communities being impacted by development projects, 
have set an exceptional precedent in the Andean region. 
Within Colombia, the three goals of equity, efficiency and sustainability have been given to regional 
environmental authorities, CARs. They are responsible for granting water concessions, determining 
efficiency caps, approving efficiency programmes for large water users, enforcing stream closure, and 
making final decisions about watershed management and planning. In regions where hydroelectric 
dams are present, CARs have excessive economic power which has corrupted their governance and 
perpetuated their seizure by private corporate interests, political leaders and NGOs (Canal Albán and 
Rodríguez Becerra, 2008). Against the abuse of centralised decision making, the inclusion of water as a 
social right plus instruments of social participation in the constitution of 1991 have allowed people and 
communities to appropriate legal instruments and institutions such as the constitutional court to 
defend their right to water. 
Ecuador 
The predominance of water in the Ecuadorian constitution was the response to more than 20 years of 
water policies that had had profound implications for the accumulation of land and water at the 
expense of peasant and indigenous groups. The process that led to the new constitution originated in 
the reduction of the role of the state during the 1980s and 1990s that was evident in the maintenance 
of a poorly funded national organisation in charge of water governance, the water resources national 
council (CNRH – Consejo Nacional de Recursos Hídricos) which had limited authority and power to 
formulate policies. In the absence of a central water authority, decentralised state agencies, NGOs and 
organised water users started developing local solutions (Hoogesteger, 2011) and created a wider base 
of engaged civil society, especially in the Andean region of the country (Boelens et al., 2010). Social 
movements, based on the needs and experience of these grassroots organizations, were a critical force 
in the struggle to reform the constitution towards principles of equity and inclusion. 
Prior to the constitution of 2008 the diverse legislation for water had allowed varied interpretations 
and confusion producing de facto ownership of water by individuals and corporations. The multiple 
norms and regulations had created a myriad of conflicting institutions which fragmented 
responsibilities to regulate and control water use for individual economic sectors. The discretionary 
power of these institutions for administrative decisions such as permits, authorisations, licences or 
concessions produced a permanent failure to comply with the water law of 1972, which established 
priorities for allocation according to uses and users. The agrarian reform of 1997 legalised the 
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possibility of automatic transfer of water rights with the transfer of land, which led to the concentration 
of water parallel to the concentration of land. The result of this trend was that the small farmers 
producing most of the food for national consumption, corresponding to 86% of total water users had 
access to 13% of available water while large landowners who represent 1% of agricultural units 
concentrate on 64% of the resource (Gaybor et al., 2008). The water law of 1972 determined that water 
concessions for economic activities were granted for a limited period of time, contrary to the 
concessions for domestic use, which were granted for an indeterminate period. In 1996, through the 
creation of the CNRH, the state overrode the law by establishing that water concessions for irrigation 
would also be granted for indeterminate periods of time (Gaybor, 2011). In practice this meant the 
privatization of water rights. As stated by Terán (2005) Ecuadorian laws have been used by economic 
and political elites to impose their agendas over a debilitated civil society. 
In reaction to this reality, the Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 established the human right to water 
and the rights of nature; declared water a strategic national patrimony for the public good; explicitly 
prohibited its privatisation; established that water management is the responsibility of public and 
community organisations and that public services of water, sanitation and irrigation can only be 
supplied by public and community agencies responding to principles of universality, uniformity, 
efficiency, accessibility, regularity, continuity and quality. The priorities for water allocation are 
formulated in the following order: domestic use, irrigation for food sovereignty, ecological flows, and 
productive activities. The constitution also established that people should be involved in the design, 
approval, evaluation and control of public policies related to water. The goal of collective well-being 
(buen vivir) is stated in the new constitution as the goal of development, and the constitutional 
mandates related to water represent a conceptual break with previous conceptions of development 
(Escobar, 2010). 
The enormous difficulties to translate the goals of the constitution into effective policies have been 
widely recognised. The state was given a period of one year after the new constitution was officially 
published in October 2008, to approve a number of laws including the new water law that would 
integrate the mandates of the constitution. But after almost five years, the law is still being debated. 
The ten versions drafted in these years have responded to the chronological participation of different 
interest groups (García, 2010). Correaʼs government has taken the lead in the negotiations between 
interest groups and has avoided discussing critical points with social organisations such as the 
institutions for water governance, the productive uses of water particularly bottled water, the use of 
hot springs and the devolution of INTERAGUA (the only private water company providing water to the 
city of Guayaquil) to public administration as mandated by the constitution. The other critical transitory 
article of the constitution that has not been complied with, instructed the revision and reassignment of 
all concessions granted for irrigation within the two years following the constitution, to guarantee 
equitable access and distribution with particular attention to small and medium-size agricultural 
producers. This was perhaps the clearest attempt to reverse the effects of the inequitable allocation of 
water under the water law of 1972 and the more than 30 legal norms that supersede and contradict 
this law. 
The constitutional mandate of the reallocation of water is, clearly, in conflict with the interests of 
the current government in developing the mining sector. The plan for the expansion of extractive 
industries, to compensate for the reduction of income from oil, is considered contrary to the 
constitutional mandates of prioritising life and food sovereignty, and a threat to the ecological base of 
other economic sectors that could be the source of sustainable well-being such as small-scale 
agriculture and tourism (Sacher and Acosta, 2012). Sacher and Acosta recognise the progress made in 
the management of mining concessions, but they link the involvement of multinational corporations in 
large-scale mining projects to the well-known degradation of landscapes and water sources, destruction 
of the material base of local economies, and the irreversible redefinition of power and social structures, 
all of them incompatible with constitutional goals. 
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The bottom-up process that led to the constitutional reform and the uprising of indigenous groups in 
Ecuador 20 years ago have shifted the power balance and strengthened social movements that have 
mobilised on multiple occasions after the approval of the mining law in 2009, the development plan of 
the mining sector 2010-2015 and the granting of large mining concessions to multinational corporations 
in vulnerable regions where water sources are critical for indigenous and peasant communities. These 
movements have been repressed (Aguilar Andrade, 2010; Chicaiza, 2010; Sacher and Acosta, 2012), and 
Ecuador appears as the Latin American country where the largest number of social protests have been 
criminalised, with more than 200 indigenous and peasant leaders prosecuted for terrorism and 
sabotage in the last few years (OCMAL, 2011). Additionally, the constitutional court, in response to a 
call for unconstitutionality of the mining law made by the Confederation of Indigenous Nations of 
Ecuador (CONAIE) ruled in favour of the mining law (Chicaiza, 2010). The court recognised that the law 
had been irregularly approved since it did not comply with the required consultation to indigenous 
nationalities, but endorsed the law with three arguments: the urgency of the law; the e-mail sent by the 
ministry of non-renewable resources inviting CONAIE to comment on the law (taken by the court as a 
formal consultation); and the application of a principle previously approved by the national assembly 
that determines that in case of doubt about the constitutionality of the laws, they should be solved 
according to the opinion of the assembly (Chicaiza, 2010). This last argument has been found 
particularly biased since it undermined the hierarchy of the constitution and demonstrated the lack of 
independence of the constitutional court. 
Positive views from analysts about the Ecuadorian water reform process come from the re-
establishment of a unique water authority, the national secretariat of water (SENAGUA – Secretaría 
Nacional de Agua) with the responsibility to coordinate and administer water management in Ecuador, 
with an independent budget and at the same hierarchical level of ministries. Since its creation in May 
2008 SENAGUA has concentrated on the more than 40,000 cases of unresolved requests for water 
permits or water conflicts; the establishment of regional offices partnering with local institutions within 
specific territories; and on contributing to the formulation of the new water law (Hoogesteger, 2010). 
The greatest task of SENAGUA however concentrates on confronting the power of large water users 
that either do not hold a concession, hold concessions but do not pay the associated tariff, or use tariffs 
as an exclusionary mechanism to prevent poorer users from accessing water. It is calculated that in the 
production of bananas and sugar cane, two of the major export crops of the country, 69 and 30%, 
respectively, of the land under irrigation is not associated with a water concession (Gaybor et al., 2008). 
The tariff charged annually for concessions averages US$1.85 per l/s but the government receives less 
than 7% of what it should receive according to the existing 64,000 concessions in Ecuador (Gaybor, 
2011). Tariffs determined autonomously by municipalities with equity goals in mind have failed. Some 
municipalities based their tariffs on a cross-subsidy scheme according to the type of production and the 
amount of water use, to benefit small water users and charge more per concession to large, more 
affluent agricultural producers. This however had the opposite effect, as municipal employees 
subsequently prioritised the physical distribution of water to those who made the larger monetary 
contributions (Hidalgo, in press). 
Ecuador has incorporated innovative ideas in relation to the goal of maintaining a sustainable scale 
of human appropriation of water into its legal framework. The constitution of 2008 includes the 
principle of good living (buen vivir) under which the state guarantees development within the 
regenerative capacity of ecosystems. The constitution also makes the state responsible for planning and 
management of water in the following order of priority: 1) human use; 2) food sovereignty; and 3) 
ecological flows. Significantly, Ecuador was the first country to incorporate in its constitution the rights 
of nature, stating that nature has the right to exist, maintain and regenerate its cycles, structure, 
functions and processes in evolution, and that every person, community or nationality is able to 
demand the recognitions of these rights before public organisms (Art. 71). It also declares that nature 
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has a right to restoration (Art. 72). Despite the intent of these innovations to prioritise equity and 
sustainability, they remain aspirational. 
Peru 
The regulation of the water sector in Peru clearly favours efficiency over equity or sustainability. The 
term equity is not used in the text of the water law (Law of Water Resources No. 29338 approved in 
March 2009) or the regulations of the law (approved by supreme decree No. 001-2C 10-AG in January, 
2010). In turn, the term efficiency or efficient is used 34 times in the text of the law and 72 times in the 
text of the regulations. This obvious unbalance in the national legal administration of water has left 
traditionally marginalised communities defenceless when confronted by large commercial water users. 
Multiple cases have been reported in the literature describing the tension between the Peruvian law 
that established how water users should be organised and formally solicit water licences, and the 
Andean communities that perpetually challenge state control over water sources and refuse to comply 
with the stateʼs regulations (Urteaga, 2006; de Vos et al., 2006; Boelens, 2009; Guevara-Gil, 2010; 
Boelens et al., 2011; Bueno de Mezquita, 2011; Verzijl, 2011; Sosa and Zwarteveen, 2011; Panfichi and 
Coronel, 2011). 
The term equity is used only in article 94 of the regulations (supreme decree 09-95) of the general 
law of water and sanitation (Law No. 26338 of July 1994) that states that water and sanitation tariffs 
should be established in line with the principles of: 1) Economic efficiency – tariffs should induce the 
allocation of resources that maximises the benefits for society; 2) Financial viability – tariffs should aim 
at recovering the costs of an efficient operation according to the levels of quality and service defined by 
the National Superintendence of Sanitation Services – SUNASS; 3) Social equity – the state will 
implement a policy to allow access to the service to the largest number of people; 4) Simplicity – tariffs 
will be easy to understand, apply and control; and 5) Transparency – the tariff system will be made 
public. In this text, equity is defined in utilitarian terms (maximising greatest utility for the greatest 
number of people), an approach that has been criticised on ethical grounds as it can impose a great 
burden on the few in order to provide benefits to the majority, and also distant from guaranteeing 
universal access to a basic amount for all. 
The 2009 water law in Peru introduces a mechanism that clearly favours water users who can make 
improvements in efficiency at the expense of water users who cannot. In Art. 55 the law states that 
within the same productive use, the priority for water allocation will be for the largest public interest, 
understanding this as: 1) the highest efficiency; 2) the highest income generator; and 3) the producer of 
least environmental impact. With this definition of the public interest, the law puts efficiency above 
equity and puts less affluent farmers in clear disadvantage in relation to larger farmers who can make 
investments in efficiency improvements. 
The law created efficiency certificates that would only be granted to water users who could 
demonstrate improvements in water use efficiency. Two provisions were made by the law and the 
regulations of the law in which implicit or explicit priority is given in the allocation of water to efficient 
users. The first one is article 55 which stipulates that water users who hold a certificate of efficiency 
have priority in the allocation of new water rights over the water that has been saved by the efficiency 
improvements (explicit). The second provision is chapters 9 and 10 of the regulations of the law that 
require all operators to comply with efficiency parameters determined by the national water authority 
in order to obtain efficiency certificates; although the regulations do not explicitly state what happens 
in the event of poor compliance with the efficiency parameters, the lack of clarity generates the doubt 
about the meaning that these certificates could have in terms of allocating licences. This creates an 
incentive to big farmers or water and sanitation organisations to invest in water use efficiency at the 
expense of farmers or water boards that do not have the financial resources to improve their irrigation 
or distribution systems. 
Water Alternatives - 2014  Volume 7 | Issue 2 
Roa-García: Water allocation and trade-offs in the Andes Page | 308 
The new water law of Peru perpetuates the oversight of the diversity of systems of water allocation 
by the state and its application is increasing unequal access to water. The new water law requires 
communities to request the formalisation of their water right, using bloc licences (licencias en bloque) 
(Art. 91 of supreme decree No. 001-2C 10-AG). These licences require that the organisation that 
requests the water licence registers individual water users who are part of the bloc, allocating fixed 
amounts of water to each of the bloc members (Art. 78 of supreme decree No. 001-2C 10-AG). These 
licences have to be requested from the local water authority (ALA). If the water rights are not 
registered, they do not exist for the authority and they can be allocated to other formal and registered 
water users who request a licence, becoming a mechanism of plunder of water from communities that 
have managed their water collectively for centuries and have no interest in partitioning water rights to 
individuals (Urteaga, 2011; Vera-Delgado and Vincent, 2013).1 
By homogenising water allocation mechanisms among radically different types of water users, the 
law is an instrument of accumulation of water rights and a legal instrument of limited legitimacy. As 
described by Urteaga (2011), many communities in Peru were not consulted for the design and 
formulation of the law, which is required by Agreement 169 of the International Labour Organization – 
ILO and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) and which would have 
contributed to the legitimacy of the law by incorporating procedural justice. 
The variable legitimacy of the Peruvian water law and norms is reflected in the degrees of their 
effectiveness in the main three regions of the country. The coast is the region where national norms 
and regulations are more obeyed and enforced. The Sierra and the Amazon are regions where 
traditional forms of water organisations are still widespread, and where enforcement is reduced. One 
clear example of this situation is the effectiveness of an instrument to plan and forecast agricultural 
production that was introduced with the initial water law of 1969. This instrument was called the plan 
of agriculture and irrigation (PCR – plan de cultivo y riego) and was designed to facilitate water 
allocation in the agriculture sector. The use of this tool has been partial (mainly in the northern coastal 
region) and it is still in use since the new instrument for water allocation announced in the water law of 
2009 has not been designed as yet. The original use of the PCR was to allocate water to crops that the 
government wanted to promote; the PCR has mainly responded to profitability and less to water 
efficiency of individual crops. Operationally, each farmer presents a plan of production for a chosen 
crop, and all the demands are compared to the forecasted water availability at 75% of reliability, and 
approved or adjusted proportionally. In recent years, there has been a proliferation of sugar cane 
growers who, based on the year-round water demand of the crop incorporated into the PCR, are being 
allocated significant volumes of water at the expense of farmers who have other less water-intensive 
crops, who do not receive any water during periods of low water levels in the reservoirs. Hence, the 
PCR does not provide an incentive for efficient or equitable use of water (Hendriks, 2011). 
In the south of Peru many of the water user boards (of which there are 112 in the country each with 
between 50 and 60,000 farmers) have not accepted the PCR and have used proportional allocation of 
available water according to irrigation areas independent of the type of crop. This is a simpler system 
that does not require complex calculations to compare total demands of individual crops versus 
availability with the physical infrastructure for water distribution is relatively fixed, and it is considered 
more equitable (even if landownership is very unequal). Under this system the risk of water scarcity is 
transferred to the producers who in turn seek to increase the efficiency of their individual crops. In the 
northern coast of Peru where allocation is done using the PCR, the boards spend a significant portion of 
                                                          
1
 These reforms were preceded by the creation of PROFODUA (Programa de Formalización de Derechos de Uso de Agua - 
Program to Formalize Rights to Use Water) in 2004, through which water rights were granted individually and in blocs thus 
avoiding the use of the term 'collective right'. These water rights could be traded or exchanged creating the conditions for a 
market of water rights to emerge (Vera-Delgado and Vincent, 2013). 
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their resources on funding personnel required to administer a sophisticated distribution system. This 
leaves them with insufficient resources to pay for transportation and office space. In contrast in the 
south, the boards, even with less area and volumes of water to distribute, have enough resources to 
invest in capital such as trucks for the technicians who distribute the water, and office space (Hendriks, 
2011). In the Andean region of Peru, there are other examples of water distribution systems that have 
built seasonal reservoirs which operate on a more equitable and efficient basis. One of these systems 
allocates water stored in reservoirs to individual families with an amount sufficient to irrigate 
approximately 1/3 of a hectare, independently of the size of the family and without considering other 
water sources that individual families may access (Hendriks, 2011). 
Nationally, water allocation is charged according to the economic sector, with the industrial sector 
paying around US$0.0216/m3, followed by mining (US$0.015/m3), domestic (US$0.0051/m3) and 
agriculture (between US$0.0004 and 0.001/m3). In comparison, hydroelectricity generators pay 1% of 
the cost of energy generation. According to Hendriks (2011) there is no disclosure of the amount of 
money that the government receives from licence fees. Approximately 70% of irrigation farmers in the 
coastal region and most of large potable water systems pay water fees. In the Andean region, most 
registered water users pay the fees, although most water users are not registered. It is known that in 
some cases water users have been persuaded to make payments to the local water authority with the 
argument that fees are a way to secure a water licence they have not registered. With this pressure, 
unregistered users pay a fee impacting their capacity to fund their own operations. 
For over a decade, the national water authority has maintained that the mining sector uses 2% of 
the total consumptive water, even after the sharp increase in mining concessions of the last few years 
(Hendriks, 2011). This is in part due to the lack of monitoring or control over licences and actual use of 
water by mining operations. Hendriks notes licences for 120 l/s that use between 250 and 300 l/s. 
These companies are paying fees on the registered amount and not on their actual water use. 
Peru is a case where the paradigm of efficiency has deeply penetrated water allocation and where 
equity and sustainability principles are largely ignored through weak definitions and a lack of 
implementation mechanisms. In contrast, the efficiency discourse is widely developed in all water rules, 
and diverse instruments of technical and allocative efficiency have been put in place across economic 
sectors and between different types of users. The reform of the legal framework for water has been 
dominated by hegemonic economic groups (Roa-García et al., in press). Small and marginalised water 
users are being severely impacted by efficiency instruments that are, to a large extent, mechanisms of 
water plundering. 
TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN EQUITY, EFFICIENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
In this section I will ponder on the intrinsic meaning that each of the three principles has been given in 
each country and evaluate the trade-offs made between them. 
Equity 
The three countries have prioritised water for domestic human use above all other uses. As can be seen 
in Table 2, addressing distributive justice all countries have explicitly stated the decision to satisfy 
human needs before any other water demand. However, interesting differences are seen across 
countries. In Colombia, in addition to the prioritisation given to domestic and agricultural uses, 
community use is prioritised over individual use. However, the same water code establishes that 
environmental authorities can alter the prioritisation and can impose restrictions or expropriate water 
for a list of purposes, rendering the prioritisation ineffective. Of the three countries Ecuador has 
incorporated the most ambitious legal changes moving beyond prioritisation based on needs, to the 
prioritisation of food sovereignty following domestic use, and to the aspiration for a complete 
reallocation of water rights to improve equity in access. The constitutional reform however was solely a 
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point of departure, and this reform together with the mandate for a new water law remain unfulfilled. 
Based on the prioritisation for water allocation in the three countries the focus of distributive justice 
has been on needs more than on any notion of equity. In fact, the human right to water in these 
countries has supported the prioritisation of water to cover basic human needs. However the human 
right to water discourse has had a limited influence in debates around decision-making processes. The 
special attention that the human right to water has given to domestic water has been detrimental to 
broader approaches to water justice (Goff and Crow, 2014). 
Table 2. Prioritisation in water allocation. 
Colombia 




Water law, 2009 
Order or priority: collective or 
communal human consumption 
(urban or rural); individual human 
consumption; community 
agriculture (including aquaculture 
and fishing); individual agriculture 
(including aquaculture and fishing); 
generation of hydroelectricity; 
industry or manufacturing; mining; 
collective recreation; individual 
recreation (Art. 41). 
The environmental authority can 
change the order or priority for 
granting concessions or permits, and 
can impose restrictions or 
expropriate for purposes related to 
irrigation, flood control, water, soils 
and watershed conservation, water 
and energy supply among others 
(Art. 123). 
1. Water for domestic use 
2. Irrigation for food 
sovereignty 
3. Ecological flows 
4. Productive activities 
5. Large landholdings, 
water accumulation and 
privatisation are prohibited. 
1. Water for satisfying 
primary human se needs is 
prioritised since it is a 
human right above all 
other uses, even in times 
of scarcity (Art. 3). Use for 
satisfying primary human 
needs; population use 
2. Productive use (Art. 
35). Productive activities 
are ranked in order: 
Agriculture (crops and 
animals); aquaculture and 
fishing; energy; industrial; 
medicinal; mining; 
recreational; touristic; 
transportation (Art. 43). 
In the context of procedural justice none of the three countries have made water allocation 
participatory (see Table 3). In Colombia, watershed councils still concentrate all decision-making power 
with environmental authorities and participation in concession granting is limited to the opportunity to 
challenge a decision. In Peru, indigenous communities were not consulted during the drafting of the 
water law despite the considerable impact that the norm is having on their access to concessions and 
the fact that Peru had ratified the ILO 169 agreement. And in Ecuador, as described in section 2, the 
constitutional court disregarded CONAIEʼs plea for prior consultation with respect to the 2009 mining 
law that potentially has a significant impact on water. Having ratified the ILO 169 agreement the three 
countries are expected to perform a prior consultation (that, in some instances, is interpreted as a free 
and informed prior consent) before a) the adoption of legislative or administrative decisions, b) the 
formulation, application and evaluation of national or regional plans or programmes, and c) the 
authorisation for exploration and exploitation of resources in indigenous territories (Art. 6, 7 and 15 of 
the agreement). But to date there have only been a few cases in Colombia where the constitutional 
court has ruled in favour of local communities when prior consultation has not been carried out or 
when it has not been conducted in accordance with the law (Rodríguez-Garavito, 2012). 
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Table 3. Participation in decision making on water allocation. 
Colombia 




Water Law, 2009 
Water users can oppose the 
request of a concession by 
another water user 
CONAIE requested the mining law 
(2009) to be declared 
unconstitutional 
Decisions about concessions 
and licences are restricted to 
the National Water Authority 
(ANA)  
Only environmental authorities 
can make decisions about 
watershed management plans 
designed by watershed councils 
Constitutional court endorsed the 
law arguing the urgency of the law 
and granting the national assembly 
the power to decide on 
constitutionality in cases of 
uncertainty 
Watershed councils can be 
consulted 
All three countries have ratified the ILO 169 Agreement recognising the right of indigenous 
communities to be consulted and provide consent for projects with negative impact potential 
Equity has gained some space reflected in the prioritisation in water allocation, particularly in Ecuador 
and Colombia, where explicit priorities are given to food sovereignty and community irrigation over any 
large-scale productive activities. However, equity remains a secondary goal as demonstrated by the lack 
of mechanisms of enforcement and by the ultimate decision-making mechanisms that despite much 
rhetoric, remain in the hands of governments. In Peru, the goal of equity in water access is reduced to a 
utilitarian approach for the implementation of tariffs for water and sanitation provision; and social 
equity in water is addressed through a policy that allows access to the service to the largest number of 
people, disregarding the human right to water for all and the protection of the most vulnerable groups 
of society. A summary of the contradictions in water policies related to equity goals is given in Table 4. 
Based on equity considerations, water allocation in these countries has limited legitimacy. The lack 
of transparency in the allocation process in Colombia and the oversight of traditional forms of allocating 
water in Peru vitiate the legitimacy of governmental decisions. Within Ecuador, legitimacy will be 
decided if and how the constitutional reforms on water are operationalised. 
Efficiency 
In the cases analysed here, there are at least three types of efficiency with distinct policies. Technical 
efficiency, which in its capped conception is reflected in policies related to the reduction of losses in 
water distribution. These policies have a true ceiling (100% efficiency) and most commonly an efficiency 
benchmark goal over which further savings (efficiency) are extremely hard to reach. This notion of 
efficiency, referred to as capped technical efficiency, does not conflict with any other goal, as its 
confinement within the physical properties of water, makes it a reasonable goal for all users and does 
not portray a false sense of water abundance that would encourage unsustainable water use. The 
Colombian law of water savings and efficient use insinuate a capped technical efficiency goal by stating 
that any individual use should not exceed the necessary amount to achieve that use, establishing goals 
for reducing water loss in distribution, commanding the reuse of water when possible and the 
installation of water use metering devices. The components of this law seek to set up normative 
benchmarks (Malghan, 2010) to aim at minimising water use for individual activities, in line with the 
capped conception of technical efficiency. One limitation of this law is the delegation of actual 
efficiency benchmarks to environmental authorities characterised by poor technical capabilities, and 
ridden by clientelism and corruption. 
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Table 4. Manifestations of the struggle over equity in water allocation. 
Obstacles for equity on water allocation 
Colombia 
Water Code, 1978 
Ecuador 
Water Law 1972, Agrarian 
Reform, 1997 
Peru 
Water Law rules, 2010 
• Onerous requisites for water 
rights 
• Limited capacity of authorities 
• Discretion in decision making 
• 70% small users do not have 
water rights  
• Water rights proportional to 
land 
• 1% landowners with 64% water 
allocated 
 
• Communities are required 
to formalise their rights using 
bloc licences and registering 
individual water users with 
fixed amounts of water  
Drivers of equity in water allocation 
Colombia 




Water Law, 2009 
• Potable water as a social right 
• Healthy environment as 
collective and environmental 
rights 
• Active constitutional court 
defending the human right to 
water (since 2003)  
• Redistribution for equitable 
water rights, food sovereignty 
(two years) 
• Human right to water 
 
• The state respects uses and 
customs of peasant and 
indigenous communities and 
their right to use water in 
their territories 
 
Summary   
Discriminatory water rights but 
active constitutional court  




Another notion of technical efficiency is reflected in policies such as the Peruvian efficiency certificates. 
The policy of efficiency certificates does not define the expected efficiency gains that would be 
rewarded with the certificates, and their lack of indication of a ceiling for water use efficiency points 
towards the notion of ever increasing water savings, or increases in output per water unit. This type of 
efficiency, referred to as uncapped technical efficiency, conflicts with sustainability goals, as per the 
rewards that the policy promises (the water saved through this policy will be allocated to efficiency 
certificate holders). This policy leads to increased water use through assumed (theoretical) efficiency 
gains, similarly to what has been found in Spain (Gómez-Gómez, 2009). 
For every productive activity there is, in theory, a minimum amount of water required to obtain the 
maximum yield of crop, mineral extraction, power, etc. The regulations governing these water laws 
specify neither minimum water requirements nor maximum yields (caps) promoting the idea of 
unlimited efficiency. The implicit uncapped efficiency notion in these norms produces two effects. On 
the one hand, it promotes the idea that production can grow indefinitely through investments in 
technology, although in many cases the new technologies (particularly for irrigation) may actually be 
less efficient (de Vos, 2013). On the other hand, it contributes to strengthening unbalanced power 
relations by deploying efficiency improvements as a neutral problem-solving instrument when, in fact, 
it is a value-loaded concept promoted by policy makers (Boelens and Vos, 2012). Thus, the notion of 
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uncapped efficiency conflicts with maintaining water use within the renewable capacity of ecosystems 
(sustainability) and with the protection of vulnerable groups of society (equity). 
Third, allocative efficiency conflicts with equity goals. A policy such as the Peruvian allocation of 
water within the same productive use to the most efficient users and the largest employment 
generators creates a further gap between large landowners and small and indigenous water users. 
Fees charged for water concessions in the three countries are not providing allocative efficiency 
incentives. In contrast, they reflect more an interest to charge water according to the profitability of the 
respective activity, proportionally to their capacity to pay (cases of Colombia and Peru) or a notion of 
equity (Ecuador). Industrial and mining operations pay more for water concessions in Peru than 
domestic and agricultural users. This policy has had regressive effects on equity in the three countries 
since those grantees that pay more for their concessions are favoured over those who pay less or do 
not pay. 
Table 5 summarises key examples of water efficiency policies in the three countries: Peru 
emphasising allocative and uncapped technical efficiency, Colombia focused on capped technical 
efficiency, and Ecuador having no practical application of efficiency within its water laws. 
Table 5. Efficiency in water allocation. 
Colombia 




Water Law, 2009 
Formal water users  
programme of efficient use and 
water savings 
  
Efficiency paired with other 
principles such as equity, 
sustainability, precaution and 
prevention 
  
Within the same productive 
use: 
• Highest efficiency 
• Highest income 
generator 
Certificates of efficiency  
Summary 
Capped and uncapped technical 
efficiency 
No practical application of the 
term 
Unspecified notion of efficiency  
Strong emphasis on allocative 
efficiency and uncapped 
technical efficiency 
Sustainability 
Attempts at limiting the scale of human appropriation of water have been weak and slow. A summary 
of sustainability within water allocation rules is provided in Table 6. Ecuador has incorporated 
innovative and ambitious instruments into the constitution including development within the 
regenerative capacity of ecosystems, and the rights of nature; however, Ecuador lacks practical 
instruments for implementation of constitutional reforms. Colombia has incorporated extreme 
measures since 1978 where streams can be declared closed when concessions granted reach or exceed 
the available water flow. In Peru, the restriction of water allocation and use is based on the 
maintenance of ecological flows, a concept that has been included in the water law but not regulated as 
yet. 
The development of policies to maintain the rate of water use within sustainable boundaries is 
limited. Ecological economists have recognised the importance of solving sustainability and equity 
issues before prioritising efficiency goals; but they have also acknowledged that under current global 
trading arrangements, any country that elected to adopt sustainable resource use and equity goals 
would be disadvantaged in a competitive sense (Lawn, 2007). The logic of individual freedom and 
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maximum economic returns proves perverse when confronted with the societal goals of sustainability 
and equity. 
Table 6. Sustainability (scale) of water allocation. 
Colombia 




Water Law, 2009 
• Declaration of water source 
closure: when the total of 
concessions granted reach or 
exceed the available water flow 
• Based on scarcity index and 
ecological flows (Resolution 865 
of 2004) 
  
• Principle of good living (buen 
vivir): the state will guarantee 
development within 
regenerative capacity of 
ecosystems 
• Responsible for planning and 
managing water for 1) human 
use; 2) food sovereignty; 3) 
ecological flows 
• Rights of nature 
• Conditions for granting 
water rights: the source 
should have enough 
water to guarantee 
ecological flows, 
minimum levels of 
reserves or navigational 
conditions 
Summary 
• Water rights restrictions 
• Defined scarcity index and 
ecological flows but not 
operational  
• Innovative tools for keeping 
water use within a sustainable 
scale 
• Not related to water rights  
• Water rights 
conditioned to ecological 
flows 
• Instrument not defined  
Many of the recent reforms on water laws that stress equity and sustainability have originated from 
social movements that base their arguments not on the balance between equity, efficiency and 
sustainability principles, but on a paradigm shift towards an integration of nature and culture (Roa-
García et al., in press). Indeed equity principles are based on an indistinct separation of individual and 
community; and sustainability principles are based on the coalescence between nature, culture and 
society. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conflicts between water users are increasing, making evident the lack of a judicious, balanced and 
transparent procedure for water allocation in regions where demand comes from users with a wide 
range of needs and different levels of power, and where human appropriation of water is reaching 
unsustainable levels. While no definitions of equity, efficiency or sustainability are included in Andean 
water laws, their meaning is implicit. The three countries balance these principles without defining 
them. In all countries, a lack of public participation in how decisions are made characterises water 
allocation decision making, which is the most basic form of inequality. In norms or in practice, decision 
making is limited to the state, which in most cases protects private interests at the expense of 
sustainability and equity goals. 
Equality and need rather than equity has been used as the guiding principle for water allocation and 
access, and find their expression in the human right to water. In the name of equality the human right 
to water has not addressed equity concerns. The notion of equity, which includes the right to 
participate in decision making, is marginally used to guide norms for water allocation. In Colombia and 
Peru, equity in water allocation is not pursued through any legal tools. 
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Water allocation mechanisms appear disjointed in the three countries. The weight that each 
principle has been given in the law reflects the prioritisation given: to equity in Ecuador, to allocative 
efficiency in Peru and to the independence of the state to make decisions in water allocation in 
Colombia. The principle of distributive justice (fairness) is expressed in the three countries but they lack 
implementation and oversight mechanisms. Procedural justice (participation) is expressed in Colombia 
and Peru through watershed councils and in the ratification of the ILO 169 agreement by the three 
countries providing prior consultation to ethnic minorities. However, final decisions are still 
concentrated in national or regional authorities. Allocative efficiency (economic output) is highly 
pursued in Peru. In Colombia, efficiency is defined in technical terms, but the designation of efficiency 
caps (ceilings) and decision making remain concentrated within environmental authorities. In Ecuador, 
efficiency is mentioned but not developed as a principle for water allocation. 
Ecological economists have stressed the importance of working simultaneously on the three 
separate goals regarding the allocation of scarce resources: equity, efficiency and sustainability (Daly, 
1991, 1992; Lawn, 2004, 2007; Malghan, 2010). Equity, efficiency and more recently sustainability 
represent societal goals that are in conflict in the Andes. The laws and norms that regulate water 
allocation and their compliance in the Andean countries mirror the tension between models of society 
that represent conflicting value systems and raise the question of the compatibility of these principles. 
Inserted to varying degrees in the global economy, the countries in the region have adopted the values 
or goals of equity, efficiency and sustainability in allocation as water is recognised as one of the most 
basic conditions for life. Equity has been given a surrogate role losing its priority as a critical factor in 
the search for more just societies. Despite the intentions of constitutions and laws to achieve equity in 
water access, the prevailing political economy of water favours efficiency at the expense of equity. With 
water as with land, efficiency in allocation has taken priority over equity and sustainability, producing 
greater inequality and contributing to making Latin America the most unequal region in the world. 
Water laws in these three countries indicate: 1) that while efficiency has become the bastion of neo-
liberalisation, equity and sustainability principles are either neglected or have become subsidiary; 2) 
that implicit definitions of equity fall short in promoting the interests of the disadvantaged; and 3) that 
the complex definition, measurement and monitoring of what constitutes a sustainable scale of human 
water use, makes it an impractical goal. 
Trade-offs in water allocation principles are similar to other global challenges such as climate 
change. Climate talks in the global arena revolve around the total capacity of the atmosphere to receive 
carbon emissions (sustainability), the right of developing countries to use the atmosphere as a sink for 
their emissions versus developed countries that have a larger share (equity), and the 
projects/technologies that produce the most value/energy/output with the least amount of emissions 
(efficiency). However, just like in climate talks, a balanced state between these three goals seems 
unachievable. When compared with legal instruments, incentives and narratives for efficiency, equity 
and sustainability appear insignificant. 
This article exemplified the failure in achieving trade-offs between the goals of equity, efficiency and 
sustainability in order to remain within a sustainable scale and attain social justice for irreplaceable 
'goods' such as water. Achieving a balance between equity, efficiency and sustainability appears 
unrealistic within the current paradigm. This is increasingly suggesting the need to remove efficiency 
from this triad of principles in water allocation and make it an important but subsidiary tool to 
sustainability and equity. 
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